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Abstract: This paper investigates the impact of globalization on productivity growth and the procyclicality
of productivity growth in manufacturing industries in the United States and Germany.  For U.S. industries,
the analysis suggests that changes in international demand affects productivity growth differently from
changes in exposure to international competition.  An increase in foreign demand for U.S. exports raises
trend productivity growth, but to a lesser degree than does a similar demand shock from domestic buyers.
On the other hand, whereas an increase in U.S. imports reduces trend productivity growth of U.S.
industries, a loss of market share to imports is associated with gains to productivity growth.  For Germany,
neither international demand shocks nor exposure to international competition seem to be associated with
productivity growth rates, perhaps because German industries experienced a smaller increase in exposure
to international competition over the time period.  Comparing the U.S. and German results suggests that
"going global" may affect productivity growth rates more than simply "being global".  As for the
procyclical characteristics of productivity growth, the U.S. and German measures evidence different
procyclical behavior.  For many industries, both U.S. and German labor productivity growth rates exhibit
some degree of procyclicality.  For German industries, this procyclicality of productivity growth disappears
with broader measures of productivity growth that include utilization of capital and intermediates inputs.
For U.S. industries, the degree of procyclicality increases when productivity growth is measured on these
broader bases.  Moreover, in the United States, procyclicality appears to be accentuated by export demand
growth and dampened by import  demand growth.
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I. Introduction
This paper investigates the impact of globalization on productivity in manufacturing
industries in the United States and Germany.  Using disaggregated data from the manufacturing sectors
in Germany and the United States, I investigate two hypotheses of how globalization and productivity
might be related.  The first hypothesis investigates the relationship between globalization and changes
in the productivity growth rate.  The second hypothesis investigates the importance of globalization for
the procyclical characteristics of productivity.  Globalization is proxied by real exports and imports, both
real volumes and as a share of output and apparent domestic consumption, respectively.  Productivity is
measured three ways:  (1) Labor productivity; (2) A Solow residual from a calculation including labor and
utilization-adjusted capital; (3) A Solow residual from a calculation including labor, materials, and
utilization-adjusted capital.  The time period analyzed is 1979 to 1995 for the United States and 1981 to
1994 for Germany. 
For U.S. industries, the analysis suggests that international demand growth affects trend
productivity growth differently from the effect of greater international exposure.  Increased export demand
is associated with an increase in trend productivity growth; but this increase is less than is associated with
an increase in domestic shipments.  Thus, the positive correlation between productivity growth and the
share of exports in output found by some other researchers is not corroborated by this study.
1 On  the
other hand, while increased import growth is associated with lower trend productivity growth, an increase
in import competition (measured by the share of imports in domestic demand) increases trend productivity
growth.  Thus, whereas increased imports apparently do not induce productivity enhancements, loss of
market share to imports does.  Comparing across the measures of productivity growth, labor markets do
not bear the brunt of the reallocation of inputs necessary to achieve productivity gains; reallocations in
the use of materials is particularly important for raising productivity growth rates.  Capital utilization is
more affected by the overall level of output, regardless of source or destination. 
                                                     
     
1See for example, the work of J. Bradford Jensen and Nathan Musick, Andrew B. Bernard and
J.Bradford Jensen, and Martin Neil Baily and Jans Gersbach.2
For Germany, no element of international demand or exposure seems to be related to
productivity growth rates.
2 One reason for this different behavior could be the difference in initial and
subsequent international demand and exposure.  German industries generally started the period under
examination with a much higher share of output exported and a much higher share of domestic demand
satisfied by imports.  A smaller additional share of German output was exported over the period, and
import penetration rates also grew more slowly.  By the end of the period, however, the exposure of U.S.
and German industries, as defined by exports as a share of output and imports as a share of domestic
consumption, are fairly similar. 
Further examination of the German data suggests another reason why it may be difficult
to find any relationship between productivity growth and globalization:  average productivity growth over
the period varies quite substantially across the alternative measures.  For the U.S. calculations, the
productivity measures corroborate each other as to which industries are ones with high average
productivity growth rates; but, for Germany, the three measures of productivity growth do not move
together.  Instead, for many of the industries, the productivity growth measures other than labor
productivity are negative, indicating a deterioration in the efficiency in the use of non-labor resources over
time.
As for the procyclical characteristics of productivity growth, the U.S. and German measures
evidence different procyclical behavior.  For many industries, both U.S. and German labor productivity
growth rates have some degree of procyclicality.  For German industries all procyclicality of productivity
growth rates disappears with the broader measures; this would appear to be associated with the negative
productivity growth of these broader measures for many industries, and is consistent with the results of
other researchers.
3  But, for the U.S. industries, the degree of procyclicality increases when productivity
growth rates are measured on a broader basis to include capital and materials utilization.  Moreover, the
                                                     
     
2These results differ from those of Fitzenberger.  He uses a sample period that begins in 1975. 
     
3See Gebhard Flaig and Viktor Steiner.3
degree of procyclicality appears to be related to both export and import demand growth.  Export growth
accentuates procyclicality, particularly through an effect of capital utilization.  Import growth appears to
dampen procyclicality through the capital channel.
The structure of the paper is as follows:  The next section reviews the construction of the
different measures of productivity and discusses how globalization might affect productivity.  Section III
describes the data and how each of the measures of productivity was implemented with the data.  Section
IV analyzes the results for the United States and for Germany.  Section V offers some final remarks. 
II.  Measures of productivity growth and the role for globalization
Measures   of   productivity   growth
There is no standard measure of productivity growth, nor a standard by which to judge
which of these might best measure technological change.  Accordingly, I examine three measures.  Each
is the residual from the calculation of the difference between the log change in a measure of real output
(a value-added measure—y or a gross-output measure—q) and the log change in measures of real inputs
(including, variously weighted, labor—l, capital services—k, and materials—m).
1. Labor input measure of productivity: 
     Labor = y -l 
Labor productivity is a good place to start.  Since it has the fewest variables and since it does not require
a decision about how to account for other inputs or the returns to scale in production, it is easiest to
implement with the data and is less prone to misinterpretation--labor productivity growth is what it is.
On the other hand, labor productivity growth is limited as it does not indicate how firms adjust inputs to
achieve output gains, and it clearly is not a measure of technology.  Many forces other than technological
change can affect labor productivity–in particular a change in the capital-labor ratio.
2.  Solow residual measure of productivity growth:
     Solow =  y - a*l - (1-a)*l*K  a is the labor share in nominal value added
                                         K is the capital stock; capital services are proportional4
                                         to K with factor of proportionality l. 
The Solow residual is the benchmark against which many other productivity measures are judged.
Unfortunately, while clear as a theory, the assumption that capital services are proportional to the capital
stock often yields unsatisfactory movements in the original Solow measure of productivity when
implemented with data. 
3.  Labor and capital utilization-adjusted measure of productivity growth:
     K&L = y - a*l  - (1-a)*k 
This measure of productivity is derived in Burnside et al.
4  They assume that real gross output (q) is
produced using value-added (y) and materials (m) in a Leontief specification.  As shown above, value
added output (y) is then produced using labor inputs (l) and capital services (k) according to constant
returns to scale.  The Leontief assumption implies that variation in the use of materials inputs cannot be
a source of variation in productivity growth.
4.  Labor, materials, and capital input-adjusted measure of productivity growth: 
     KLM = 1/(1-g) [q - b*l -g*m - (1-b-g)*k];  b is the labor share in nominal gross output
                                         g is the materials share in nominal gross output
                                         1/(1-g) adjustment to value-added basis
5
This productivity measure extends the previous measuring to include the productivity gains that come from
a reallocation of materials inputs, as well as of other inputs.
6  Basu and Fernald find that one important
reason for measures of aggregate productivity to change is that shocks cause resources to be reallocated
across industries--from lower-valued uses to higher valued uses.  This reasoning could apply equally well
to the reallocation of resources across plants within an industry. 
Role   for   forces   of   globalization
                                                     
    
     4Craig Burnside, Martin Eichenbaum, and Sergio Rebelo (1995). 
     
5This simple adjustment is correct if we assume that the markup of price over cost does not change;
see discussion of this assumption is Basu and Fernald, pp 25-26.
     
6This specification can also be found in Burnside, et al.5
Globalization, as proxied by trade, could affect the trend productivity growth rate and could
affect the procyclicality of the productivity measures. The following decomposition of output points out
two channels:  the growth of real exports and real imports, and changes in the share of exports in output
and in the share of imports in domestic demand.  Total output (Q) equals the amount produced to satisfy
domestic consumption (D) as well as to satisfy export demand (X).  On the other hand, total output is
reduced by the amount of domestic consumption that is satisfied by imports (M).  Thus, the growth in
total output can be calculated as: 
     dQ/Q = dD/D * D/Q + dX/X * X/Q - dM/M *M/D 
However, for globalization per se to affect productivity,  international sales or forces of
international competition must elicit a different response from the firm than do domestic sales or  domestic
competition.  Suppose a firm responds to demand shocks coming from exports or imports differently than
it does to a shock to domestic demand.  Changes in the growth rate of imports or exports would affect
productivity growth differently than a similar change in growth of domestic demand.  In addition, changes
in the share of exports in output or in imports in domestic demand would affect the importance of the
international shocks. 
Why should firms react differently to international shocks?  Firms might respond
differently to international shocks because these shocks convey different information about production
techniques than do domestic shocks.  Imported goods can be "reverse engineered", which teaches firms
foreign production technology.  In addition, if among import competing firms some are more efficient
and cost-effective producers, these firms will survive import competition longer than other import
competing firms, thus raising the average productivity growth rate of all firms that survive.  On the
export side, firms that export a high fraction of their product could have a more flexible and efficient
production technology which increases their ability to meet foreign design demands.  Moreover, firms
that do export may be the most cost effective producers world-wide of a particular product.  Bernard
and Jenson suggest that, for the United States, firms that export are also the most efficient producers6
and the technology leaders in an industry.
On the other hand, international competition could hurt productivity growth.  Increases
in import market share might contribute to a deterioration of the productivity of the domestic
industries as output falls--ultimately the domestic industry would disappear.  Gearing up to export to
many countries, although in the long-run contributing to higher productivity growth, could initially
hurt productivity growth as firms figure out how to sell into markets with different standards and
tastes. 
The differential response of firms to international forces can affect the procyclicality of
productivity measures.  To the extent that firms reallocate resources less in response to shocks that
they perceive to emanate from the international dimension (either export shocks or import shocks),
then procyclicality overall could be augmented or dampened, depending on whether the shock was
positive or negative. 
To summarize, there are three hypotheses to test on the relationship between
globalization and measures of productivity growth.  The first two focus on the long-run, cross-
sectional relationship between increased globalization--measured either as a change in growth of
exports or imports or as a change in the share of exports and imports--and changes in the trend rate of
growth of  productivity.  The third focuses on the role for globalization to accentuate or damp the
procyclicality of productivity and output. 
III.  Data and Empirical implementation 
U.S.   and   German   Data
Table 1 lists the industries examined for the United States and for Germany.  For the
United States, all data are either annual or annualized monthly data for the time period 1978 to 1995. 
All are manufacturing industries and most produce either inputs or finished products destined for the
manufacturing sector. Shipments, value-added output, and producer prices; factor inputs and factor7
prices; and trade values and trade prices are matched by industry code
7; the same index of materials
and components for manufacturing was used for all industries.
8 
For Germany, all data are annual for the time period 1981 to 1994.  The set of German
industries includes basic inputs, capital goods, and finished/consumer goods.  Thus the sample of
German industries includes more output destined for the household sector, as compared to the U.S.
data sample.  Gross-output, value-added output and producer prices; factor inputs and factor prices;
and trade values and trade prices are matched by industry code; the materials input price index and
energy price index are the same for all industries.
9 
Empirical   implementation
The empirical implementation of the calculations outlined in Section II is not
completely straightforward and not entirely consistent across the two countries.  For example, the
measure of (the log change) in labor input is the (log change in) number of production workers for the
United States, but is the (log change in) the wage bill less (log change in) average hourly wage for
Germany.  Which data to use to proxy for capital services is particularly difficult.  Following Burnside
et.al, I use (log change in) kilowatt hours for the U.S. industries.  For Germany, capital services is
proxied by the (log change in) energy bill less (log change in) energy price.  Finally, an important data
issue is that industry-specific producer prices were used to deflate both U.S. shipments and German
gross-output (which is appropriate) and value-added output (which is not correct).
10  Tables 2 and 3
                                                     
     
7The trade data are end-use codes matched to the SIC codes of the industry and factor data.  The
output and input data are from the Annual Survey of Manufactures.  The producer price and wage data
are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  The trade data are from the Department of Commerce. 
     
8It would be superior to calculate industry-specific materials deflators using an input-output table,
but data on disaggregated materials inputs and their prices are not available for the sample period
investigated here.  The NBER Productivity database has a fuller range of industries, but a less-up-to-
date time period.  The more recent data were desirable given the focus on the effect of globalization.
     
9Data on energy usage shortened the time period.  All data are from Statistisches Bundesamt. 
     
10The lack of a value-added price index may be important for interpreting some of the results of the
empirical implementation of the algebraic specifications of the previous section.  The lack of a value-
added price index implies that the capital- and material-adjusted indexes differ more in principle than in8
describe more precisely the series and transformation used in the implementation. 
                                                     
practice.  That is, in principle, we have a true measure of real value added, and that differs from real gross
output.  However, in practice, we have nominal value added and nominal gross output and only one price
deflator.  What this implies is that K&L and KLM, as implemented, differ in a specific way:
KLM  = K&L -  g /(1-g) (dPmatl/Pmatl - dPoutput/Poutput) 
If materials prices are rising faster than output prices, the capital and materials-adjusted
productivity residual (KLM) will be smaller than the capital-utilization adjusted residual (K&L). If  the
relationship between the two prices is changing over time, and changing across industries, it could
influence our interpretation of how industries achieve productivity gains through input reallocation. 9
IV.  Results and Discussion 
Productivity   Measures
The first step is simply to look at the different productivity measures in several ways: 
time series, procyclicality, and cross-correlation.  Charts 1 and 2 show, for selected U.S. and German
industries respectively, the time series representations of the three productivity measures.  As is
common, the time series are quite volatile and it is difficult to discerne procyclicality or whether there
is any trend in the productivity growth rates. 
Tables 4 and 5 show coefficients of procyclicality for each industry for each of the
three measures of productivity growth for the United States and for Germany.  The coefficient of
procyclicality is derived from a simple regression of the productivity measure against a constant and
(log change in) contemporaneous real shipments for the time period 1978 to 1995 for the United
States, and against a constant and (log change in) real gross output for the time period 1981 to 1994
for Germany. 
For many industries, both U.S. and German labor productivity growth rates have some
degree of procyclicality.  For German industries any degree of procyclicality of productivity growth
rates apparently disappears with the broader measures of producitivity growth.  This may be associated
with the negative productivity growth of these broader measures for many industries and, in any case,
is consistent with the results of other researchers.
11  For the U.S. industries, the degree of
procyclicality increases when productivity growth rates are measured on a broader basis to include
capital and materials utilization.
                                                     
     
11See Gebhard Flaig and Viktor Steiner.10
Productivity  Means
Measuring the trend rate of productivity growth is difficult, as is judging whether that
trend rate has changed.  Charts 3 and 4 show the sample means for the three productivity measures for
each industry in the U.S. and Germany.  The first observation from the U.S. productivity measures is
that the means of the three measures are broadly consistent across industries—those industries with
low means and those with high means are generally the same regardless of the productivity measure. 
The second observation is that across the different measures of productivity, labor productivity is often
the highest of the three measures, except for industries with the highest rate of growth of productivity
when capital and materials are accounted for, such as 365, 366, 367.  The labor productivity measure
would generally have a mean higher than the other two measures since all the residual between input
and output is being ascribed to labor.  When the other productivity growth measures, which account
for the use and reallocation of multiple inputs, have a higher mean, it suggests that the shares of
capital and/or materials inputs into the production process for these industries are falling.
  In contrast to the U.S., the means of the different German measures are not broadly
consistent for an industry sector--there is no clear pattern of high-productivity or low-productivity
sectors, regardless of the measure.  What is more notable is the great degree to which, across
industries, the three productivity growth measures differ from each other.  Whereas the mean of the
labor productivity measures are generally large and positive, some of the labor- and capital-adjusted
productivity growth measures and many of the labor-, capital-, and materials-adjusted measures have
negative means--suggestive of a declining rate of growth of productivity in the use of these inputs.
12
A last way to describe the relationship between the three measures of productivity
growth is to take the correlation of their sample means, as shown in Table 6.  The means of the three
measures of productivity are correlated with each other, but to differing degrees.  The labor and labor-
                                                     
     
12This observation of high labor productivity growth but negative growth rate of productivity when 
measured to include inputs other than labor is consistent with the rise in unemployment and the rise in
the capital/labor ratio in Germany that others have observed in aggregate data.  See for example,
World Economic Outlook, IMF, May 1996, Chart 21. 11
and capital-utilization adjusted residuals are highly correlated for both the United States and Germany. 
Once materials usage is included, the correlations of the mean of the productivity measures drops
substantially for Germany.  For the United States, all three measures are highly correlated. 
Patterns   of   globalization
Because patterns of globalization are central to the analysis, Table 7 for the United
States and Table 8 for Germany show how the two measures of globalization have changed for the
two countries and for the industries.  Each Table shows for each industry the share of exports in
output (initialXsh) and imports in domestic demand (initialMsh) for the first year of the sample as well
as the change in percentage points in those shares to the end of the sample period. 
German industries generally had higher initial shares of output exported and of
domestic demand satisfied by imports, as compared to U.S. industries.  Almost as a consequence of
this higher exposure initially, a smaller additional share of German output was exported over the
period and import penetration rose less than it did for the U.S. industries.  From lower initial
exposures, U.S. industries experienced a much higher increase exports as a share of output and imports
as a share of domestic demand.  By the end of the sample period, the exposure of U.S. and German
industries was similar, with German exposure somewhat higher. 
Globalization   and   productivity   growth   rates
The first hypothesis asks, for an industry, whether globalization is related to
productivity growth rates through either of two channels:  Does industry productivity respond
differently to international demand shocks than to domestic demand shocks?  Are the industries with
the greatest increase in productivity growth rate those with the greatest increase in international
exposure (e.g. increase in exports or imports as a share of their output)? 
Tables 9 and 10 show for the United States and Germany the output from regressions
that are based on the discussion in Section II.  The empirical approach splits the sample period,
calculates the means of the variables in the two sub-sample periods, and differences the means. 12
Splitting the sample and differencing yields proxies for how trends in productivity growth, domestic
demand growth, export and import growth, and export and imports shares changed between the first
and the second half of the sample; this also helps to eliminate industry-specific factors.  A separate
regression for each productivity measure is shown.  Thus the regressions take the form (with variable
names in italics):
[difference(mean(productivity growth rate))] = (labor, K&L, KLMva)
  a* [mean (share of exports in output) in the first half of the sample] (Xsht0)
+b* [mean (share of imports in domestic demand) in the first half of the sample] (Msht0)
+c* [difference(mean(growth rate of domestic shipments))] (dlDomship)
+d*  [difference(mean(share of exports in output))] (difmnXsh)
+e* [difference(mean(share of imports in domestic demand))] (difmnMsh)
+f* [difference(mean(growth rate of exports))](dlXgrow)
+g* [difference(mean(growth rate of imports))](dlMgrow)
Controlling for the initial exposure to export and import competition (a and b), does
productivity growth on average respond differently to mean growth of external demand than to mean
growth domestic demand (e.g., are the coefficients on f and g significantly different from zero and
different from c); and how does productivity growth change as the share of exports in output changes
(d) and as import market share changes (e)? 
Table 9 shows results for the United States.  First a high percentage of the variation in
the data is explained by the variables.  Second, an increase in mean growth of domestic shipments is
associated with an increase in mean productivity growth rate.  An increase in export demand also is
associated with an increase in the productivity growth rate (0.40), but to a lesser extent than the
increase in domestic demand (0.57); thus increased dependence on exports as a share of output
apparently reduces mean productivity--as the negative sign on the export share variable also suggests. 
An increase in mean import growth negatively affects mean productivity growth (-0.10), although the13
deterioration in productivity growth is substantially less than it would be given a decline in domestic
demand (-0.57); thus increased import competition apparently increases productivity--as the positive
sign on the import market share variable also suggests.  Altogether, these results suggest that losses in
market share to imports stimulates producers to find more efficient ways of combining resources thus
raising mean productivity growth.  Export demand does support productivity, but apparently exporting
is hard work.  A high dependence on exports as a share of output is associated with lower mean
productivity growth perhaps because it is difficult to efficiently use resources to meet varied foreign
standards and tastes.
For Germany (Table 10), very little of the variation in the data is explained by either
the domestic or globalization variables.  It may be that German industry does not distinguish between
domestic and international demand shocks because there has been relatively little increase in
globalization over the sample period.  The fact that domestic demand variables are also not important
in explaining variations in productivity growth suggests that factors such as domestic regulation may
be the driving force behind changes in trend productivity growth.  This would be consistent with the
very different behavior of the three measures of productivity growth. 14
Trade  and  the  procyclicality  of  productivity  and  output   
The last hypothesis outlined in Section II was that the procyclicality of productivity and
output might be affected by the interaction of industries’ different responses to globalization with the
importance of international exposure.  Tables 4 and 5 showed the cofficient of procyclicality for each
of the productivity growth measures for the U.S. and German industries.  Tables 11 and 12 show the
results of a simple regression of these procyclicality coefficients against the globalization variables: 
[cross-section of industry coefficients of procyclicality] = (labor, K&L, KLMva)
  a* [mean(share of exports in output) in first half of sample] (Xsh-t0)
+b* [mean(share of imports in domestic demand) in first half of sample] (Msh-t0)
+c* [mean(growth rate of exports))](dlXgrow)
+d*  [mean(growth rate of imports))](dlMgrow)
Not surprisingly, there is little evidence that labor procyclicality in Germany is related
to international demand or exposure (Table 11).  However, there is some evidence that procyclicality
evidenced in U.S. data (Table 12) might be related to international factors--principally through the
channel of capital usage.  Strong export demand growth increases the procyclicality of the K&L
measure, whereas strong import growth would appear to dampen the coefficient of procyclicality of
this measure.  One explanation for this behavior is that U.S. firms base capital decisions on expected
domestic demand.  Higher export demand must be met with the same capital--thus raising
procyclicality.  Higher import demand smooths out what would be peaks in domestic demand--thus
dampening procyclicality.15
V. Final  Remarks
As an overall summary, these results suggest that for the United States but not for
Germany the forces of international demand growth and competition have important and independent
effects on productivity growth rates.  U.S. firms respond differently to globalization than to domestic
forces.  One difference between the U.S. and German firms is on the extent to which international
exposure increased for the U.S. firms--both exports as a share of output and imports as a share of
domestic demand.  Increased global competition may spur increases in productivity growth more than
just simply facing the same degree of international competition. 
Besides being interesting in their own right, these results feed into several important
debates ongoing in the profession and in the policy community:  first, the debate on the effect of
globalization on labor markets and second, the debate on the origin of procyclicality.
Many studies of the impact of trade on labor markets assume that globalization and
productivity growth are independent forces.
13  Most of these econometric or factor analyses of
employment or relative wage dispersion measure the effect of globalization with import prices or
import flows, but do not account independently for productivity growth.  Instead, the substantial
residual unexplained effect in the regression is termed  “technological change”.  If trade and
productivity growth are interdependent forces affecting the labor market, then including only one in a
simple regression will bias that coefficient:  up to the extent that the two forces covary positively or
down to the extent that they covary negatively.  The results in this paper for the United States 
indicate that international demand as well as international competition affect trend productivity growth
rates.  Thus, the next step in research on the effects of international forces on U.S. labor markets
should include export as well as import variables and should explicitly take account of productivity
growth. 
                                                      
    
     13For Germany, Fitzenberger op. cit.  For the United States see for example:  Eli Berman, John
Bound, and Zvi Griliches; George Borjas and Valerie Ramey; George Borjas, Richard Freeman, and
Lawrence Katz; Robert Feenstra and Gordon Hanson; Paul Krugman and Robert Lawrence; Robert
Lawrence and Matthew Slaughter; Edward Leamer; Jeffrey Sachs and Howard Shatz; Adrian Wood. 16
    The results in this paper also are important for the research that addresses the role of
technology vs. other factors in affecting, on the one hand, the procyclicality of productivity and output
and, on the other hand, long-term growth.  Researchers have examined various hypotheses for the
source of procyclicality in U.S. data including profit margins, labor effort, capital utilization, variation
in the shares of inputs, and resource reallocation across industries.
14  This paper suggests that global
forces of competition and technology transfer may be different from domestic forces in generating
procyclical productivity, at least in the United States. 
                                                     
    
     14See for example Susanto Basu;  Basu and John Fernald; Mark Bils; Craig Burnside, Martin
Eichengreen, and Sergio Rebelo; Ricardo J. Caballero and Richard K. Lyons; Matthew Shaprio; Robert
M. Solow. 17
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Table 1:  Included Industries
United States Germany
Industry Code Industry  Code
Basic steel products 331 Stone, clay, glass products 25
Foundry products 332 Non-ferrous metal product 28
Non-ferrous metal products 333 Chemicals 40
Fasteners, stampings 34567 Logs and planks 53
Ordnance 348 Pulp and plywood 55
Engines, turbines 351 Rubber products 59
Farm machinery 352 Various steel products 302
Construction equipment 353 Railroad, metal girders 31
Metalworking machinery 354 Farm machinery 32
Special industrial machinery 355 Autos 33
General industrial machinery 356 Electric home appliances 36
Office &computing machinery 357 Optics and clocks 37
Service industry machinery 358 Iron and steel sheets 38
Electrical industrial apparatus 362 Office machinery &computers 50
Household appliances 363 Musical equipment 39
Lighting and wiring products 364 Fine ceramics 51
TV and radio sets 365 Glassware 52
Communication equipment 366 Finished wood products 54
Electronic components 367 Finished paper products 56
Misc. electrical machinery 369 Books 57
Autos and parts 371 Finished plastic products 58
Ships and boats 373 Shoes 61
Scientific and medical eqpt. 381234 Textiles 63
Photo supplies and eqpt.  386 Apparel 6420
Table 2:  Implementation for U.S. Data 
For each industry code; industry code subscripts not shown
   
1. Labor  productivity: 
labor = y -l
y: log-change in nominal value-added less log-change in producer price
l:  log-change in production employment 
2.  Labor and capital utilization-adjusted residual: 
K&L = y - a * 1 - (1-a) * k 
y:  log-change in nominal value-added less log-change in producer price; 
a: ratio of wage bill for production employees to nominal value added 
l: log-change in production employment
k:  log-change in kilowatt hours
3.  Labor, materials, and capital-utilization adjusted residual: 
KLM = 1/(1-g) * (q - b* l -g * m - (1-b-g) * k)  ; 
q:  log-change nominal gross-output less log-change in producer prices
b  ratio of wage-bill for production employees to nominal gross output
l: log-change in production employment 
g:  ratio of materials costs to nominal gross output
m:  log change in nominal materials costs less log change in (common) deflator for
materials in manufacturing
k:  log change in kilowatt hours21
Table 3:  Implementation for the German Data
For each industry code; industry code subscripts not shown
1. Labor  productivity: 
Labor = y -l
y: log-change in nominal value-added less log-change in producer prices; 
l:  log-change in nominal personnel costs less log-change in wages. 
2.  Labor and capital-utilization adjusted residual: 
K&L = y - a * 1 - (1-a) * k 
y:  log-change in nominal value-added less log-change in producer price; 
a: ratio of wage bill to nominal value added 
l: log-change in nominal personnel costs less log-change in wages
k:  log-change in nominal energy input cost less log-change in (common) energy index
3.  Labor, materials, and capital-utilization-adjusted residual: 
KLM = 1/(1-g) * (q - b* l -g * m - (1-b-g) * k)   
q:  log-change nominal gross-output less log-change in producer prices
b  ratio of wage-bill to nominal gross output
l: log-change in nominal personnel costs less log-change in wage
g:  ratio of materials costs to nominal gross output
m:  log-change in nominal materials costs less log-change in (common) deflator for
materials in manufacturing
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Chart 2:  Productivity Measures for Selected Industries:  Germany-- 24 --
Table 4:  Coefficient of Procyclicality--United States
productivity measure
  KLM K&L labor 
0.097 * 0.648 * 0.309 331 Basic steel products
-0.054 0.098 0.13 332 Foundry products
-0.231 * 1.75 * 0.4 333 Non-ferrous metals
0.062 0.01 * 0.295 34567 Fasteners, stampings
0.162 0.106 * 0.269 348 Ordnance
* 0.468 * 0.378 * 0.222 351 Engines, turbines
* 0.375 * 0.243 * 0.216 352 Farm machinery
* 0.499 * 0.678 * 0.178 353 Construction eqpt
* 0.416 * 0.417 * 0.283 354 Metalworking mach.
0.388 0.165 0.163 355 Special ind. mach.
* 0.471 * 0.354 * 0.251 356 General ind. mach.
1.74 0.186 * 0.928 357 Offic&comp. mach.
0.449 0.301 0.113 358 Service ind. mach.
* 0.657 0.212 * 0.236 362 Electrical ind. apparatus
* 0.602 * 0.61 * 0.258 363 Household appliances
* 0.801 * 0.686 0.165 364 Lighting & wiring prod.
-0.15 -0.09 * 0.483 365 TV and radio sets
* 1.48 * 0.831 * 0.554 366 Communication eqpt.
* 0.616 * 0.717 * 0.298 367 Electronic components
* 0.945 0.181 * 0.434 369 Misc. electrical mach.
* 0.394 * 0.345 * 0.299 371 Autos and parts
0.317 0.169 0.148 373 Ships and boats
* 1.54 0.047 * 0.991 381234 Scientific & medical eqpt.
0.256 -0.535 * 0.867 386 Photo supplies & eqpt.
  
coefficient from simple regression of productivity measure against real shipments:1978-1995
* significant at 10%-- 25 --
Table 5:  Coefficient of Procyclicality--Germany
productivity measures
  KLM K&L labor 
0.221 0.386 * 0.443 25 Stone, clay, glass prod.
0.081 0.348 * 0.351 28 Non-ferrous fabrications
-2.061 -2.13 -4.663 40 Chemicals
-0.263 0.38 * 0.486 53 Logs and planks
0.009 0.594 0.461 55 Pulp and plywood
0.579 0.514 * 0.574 59 Rubber products
-4.010 0.279 * 0.286 302 Various steel prod.
0.057 0.221 * 0.363 31 Metal framing & rails
0.614 0.486 * 0.408 32 Farm machinery
0.643 0.458 * 0.424 33 Autos
0.404 0.397 0.148 36 Electrical home appl.
0.452 0.399 * 0.286 37 Optics and clocks
0.363 0.504 * 0.237 38 Iron and steel sheets
0.042 0.001 0.045 50 Office mach. & computers
0.512 0.467 * 0.625 39 Musical eqpt.
0.519 0.48 0.198 51 Fine ceramics
-0.038 0.255 * 0.292 52 Glassware
0.123 0.377 * 0.303 54 Wood products
0.519 * 0.682 * 0.361 56 Paper products
0.401 0.585 0.318 57 Books
-0.078 0.425 0.157 58 Plastic products
0.945 0.533   0.462 62 Shoes
0.161 0.319 * 0.313 63 Textiles
0.337 0.085 * 0.222 64 Apparel
coefficient from simple regression of productivity measure against real gross output:1981-1994
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Table 6:  Productivity Measures: 
Correlations of Period Means
Germany
KLM K&L labor
      1 labor
1 0.94367 K&L





  1 0.875192 0.860876 KLM-- 29 --
Table 7:  Trade Exposure--United States
diffXsh diffMsh initialXsh initialMsh codes industries
7 18 2 8 331 Basic steel products
34 29 9 37 332 Foundry products
24 18 4 10 333 Non-ferrous metal products
3 3 1 1 34567 Fasteners, stampings
46 23 7 3 348 Ordnance
43 25 11 2 351 Engines, turbines
24 13 15 10 352 Farm machinery
23 24 18 6 353 Construction eqpt
11 18 9 10 354 Metalworking mach.
21 17 13 20 355 Special industrial mach.
20 24 12 8 356 General industrial mach.
30 44 14 6 357 Office&computing mach.
10 12 7 2 358 Service industry mach.
14 20 7 6 362 Eletrical industrial apparatus
9 19 5 6 363 Household appliances
14 20 11 4 364 Lighting and wiring products
44 39 11 38 365 TV and radio sets
16 16 7 11 366 Communication eqpt.
29 40 11 11 367 Electronic components
33 47 8 10 369 Misc. electrical machinery
12 19 6 15 371 Autos and parts
32 36 1 1 373 Ships and boats
17 9 14 5 381234 Scientific and medical eqpt.
14 26 9 9 386 Photos supplies and eqpt. -- 30 --
Table 8:  Trade Exposure--Germany
diffXsh diffMsh initialXsh initialMsh codes industries
5 3 11 11 25 stone,clay,glass
20 21 39 44 28 non-ferrous fabrications
9 12 38 23 40 chemicals
8 6 17 34 53 logs/planks
15 9 29 45 55 pulp/plywood
7 11 24 21 59 rubber 
5 8 23 10 302 various steels
5 6 16 5 31 railroad/metal framing
7 11 45 17 32 farm mach
10 14 38 16 33 autos
6 13 31 19 36 elec home appliance
15 20 46 32 37 optics/clocks
9 5 25 17 38 iron/steel sheet
45 35 21 42 50 office mach/computers
10 15 56 52 39 musical eqpt
12 9 33 38 51 fine ceramics
7 7 27 21 52 glassware
6 11 12 11 54 wood products
11 7 14 8 56 paper products
4 4 16 6 57 books
6 6 25 16 58 plastic products
21 26 19 47 62 **shoes
29 33 39 41 63 textiles
11 22 26 39 64 apparel-- 31 --
Table 9:  Globalization and Productivity Growth--United States
regression of diff(mean(productivity) against
initial(mean(Xsh), initial (mean(Msh), diff(mean(domship grow)), 
diff(mean(Xsh),diff(mean(Msh), diff(mean(dlxgrow), diff(mean(dlMgrow)
raw:e3..e26, raw:h3..h26,diffs:m3..m26,diffs:e.3..e26,diffs:h3..h26, diffs:k3..k26, diffs:l3..l26
Regression Output: labor
0 Constant
2.032226 Std Err of Y Est
0.825153 R Squared
24 No. of Observations
17 Degrees of Freedom
dlMgrow dlXgrow difmnMsh difmnXsh dlDomship Msht0 Xsht0
-0.10004 0.400074 0.485583 -0.5662 0.566972 0.02891 -0.08255 X Coefficient(s)




3.16434 Std Err of Y Est
0.543081 R Squared
24 No. of Observations
17 Degrees of Freedom
dlMgrow dlXgrow difmnMsh difmnXsh dlDomship Msht0 Xsht0
-0.12365 0.54832 -0.30469 0.328755 0.635796 -0.08598 0.136883 X Coefficient(s)




2.668591 Std Err of Y Est
0.762406 R Squared
24 No. of Observations
17 Degrees of Freedom
dlMgrow dlXgrow difmnMsh difmnXsh dlDomship Msht0 Xsht0
-0.12539 0.344174 0.600585 -0.554 0.545038 0.069677 -0.1056 X Coefficient(s)
0.059021 0.117673 0.212598 0.278253 0.117563 0.081084 0.103596 Std Err of Coef.-- 32 --
Table 10:  Globalization and Productivity Growth--Germany  
regression of diff(mean(productivity) against





7.93466 Std Err of Y Est
0.226863 R Squared
24 No. of Observations
17 Degrees of Freedom
dlMgrow dlXgrow difmnMsh difmnXsh dlDomship Msht0 Xsht0
0.373653 0.139999 0.092658 -0.16158 0.208607 0.222109 -0.25443 X Coefficient(s)




3.857884 Std Err of Y Est
0.056735 R Squared
24 No. of Observations
17 Degrees of Freedom
dlMgrow dlXgrow difmnMsh difmnXsh dlDomship Msht0 Xsht0
0.298692 0.000652 0.018568 0.104734 0.261696 0.023544 0.012161 X Coefficient(s)




15.99659 Std Err of Y Est
0.247686 R Squared
24 No. of Observations
17 Degrees of Freedom
dlMgrow dlXgrow difmnMsh difmnXsh dlDomship Msht0 Xsht0
-2.78291 1.868323 0.573453 -2.16482 1.445606 0.577237 -0.34399 X Coefficient(s)
1.615455 2.133181 1.476892 1.705416 1.410621 0.322708 0.34936 Std Err of Coef.-- 33 --
Table 11:  Globalization and Procyclicality--Germany
regression of the industry-cross section of procyclicality coefficients against   




1.099999 Std Err of Y Est
0.057254 R Squared
24 No. of Observations
19 Degrees of Freedom
0.006341 -0.06886 0.010664 -0.02287 X Coefficient(s)
0.129864 0.161124 0.020275 0.022807 Std Err of Coef.-- 34 --
Table 12:  Globalization and Procyclicality--United States
regression of industry cross-section of procyclicality coefficients against
initXsh,initMsh,mean(dlXgrowth), mean(dlMgrowth)
period: 1979 to 1995
Regression Output: labor
0.197467 Constant
0.233701 Std Err of Y Est
0.264865 R Squared
24 No. of Observations
19 Degrees of Freedom
dlMgrow dlXgrow Msht0 Xsht0
0.001808 0.018912 -0.00185 0.006593 X Coefficient(s)
0.021455 0.023663 0.006986 0.011651 Std Err of Coef.
Regression Output: K&L
0.881096 Constant
0.341276 Std Err of Y Est
0.469373 R Squared
24 No. of Observations
19 Degrees of Freedom
-0.11692 0.135648 -0.03226 0.005652 X Coefficient(s)




0.352291 Std Err of Y Est
0.592679 R Squared
24 No. of Observations
19 Degrees of Freedom
0.045555 -0.00203 -0.01305 0.032085 X Coefficient(s)
0.032343 0.03567 0.010531 0.017563 Std Err of Coef.